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A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR A GLOBAL ISR CAMPAIGN

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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## **Abstract**

The new threat to national security is characterized as transnational, adaptable, asymmetric, and persistent. The U.S. military most likely will be tasked to conduct significant operations in fundamentally weak states and will place a greater emphasis on Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) to enable combat or strike functions. Future operations will depend on globally coordinated and executed ISR operations vice regionally focused ISR operations and despite many early successes, challenges remain.

The Department of Defense transformation to meet 21<sup>st</sup> Century security challenges requires a change in how ISR operations are planned and executed. A continuous, global, joint ISR campaign is necessary that will require Commander, United States Strategic Command to act as a supported commander by defining the objective of an ISR campaign and then planning and conducting that campaign.

This paper will provide the background and argument for a change in ISR planning and who should do it. It will also provide one suggested method for how to go about designing and executing an ISR campaign.

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## **Introduction**

The new threat to national security is characterized as transnational, adaptable, asymmetric, and persistent. The U.S. military most likely will be tasked to conduct significant operations in fundamentally weak states. These operations will include a wide range of activities and are likely to take place in very different locations that vary in environment, climate, geography, and threat characteristics.<sup>1</sup> And despite many early successes, challenges remain.

The Department of Defense (DOD) transformation to meet 21<sup>st</sup> Century security challenges requires a change in how Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations are planned and executed. A continuous, global, joint ISR campaign is necessary that will require Commander, United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), to act as a supported commander by defining the objective of an ISR campaign and then planning and conducting that campaign.

In determining the need for changing how ISR is planned and executed, several key questions come to mind and some crucial issues need to be addressed. Why do we need an ISR campaign? What is the purpose of an ISR campaign? What is the definition; do we go to Joint Pub 1.02 and insert ISR into the definition of campaign? What are campaigns in general? What will an ISR campaign be and what is a methodology for designing one? How should we synchronize between operational (theater) level and national intelligence collection capabilities? Accepting a definition and a concept of operations, how can an ISR campaign be operationalized (i.e. what things must be done that will result in an ISR campaign)?

This paper will provide the background and argument for a change in ISR planning and who should do it. It will also provide one suggested method for how to go about designing and executing an ISR campaign.

## **Why an ISR Campaign?**

### ***The New Security Environment***

Since Sept. 11, the U.S. military and intelligence community have played an ever-expanding role in America's response to the new threat environment. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) has already begun to move beyond Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq (e.g., to the Philippines and Horn of Africa). It is not farfetched to think that the military could become involved in uprooting terrorist groups over the coming years in a wide range of countries.<sup>2</sup> If this is the case it is likely that operations in the GWOT will be similar to what the military has become accustomed to over the past decade. Multiple and simultaneous military operations characterized the normal operating mode for the military in the recent past and the same can be expected during the GWOT.

Coming military operations in many countries probably will be characterized by enemies adept at cover, concealment, and deception (both super-empowered individuals and small groups of non-state actors as well as traditional nation states) operating in environments and terrain (urban areas or dense jungle, for example) that stresses conventional military operations and intelligence collection capabilities. The operations probably will be constrained by ever tighter rules of engagement due to international pressure or in mitigation of possible negative publicity. What this target set and environment portends is there will need to be a greater emphasis on ISR functions rather than just on combat or strike functions. The GWOT will depend on globally coordinated and executed ISR

operations vice regionally focused ISR operations. The reason is best illustrated by the story of six blind men and an elephant that describes “that how something is perceived determines how an individual understands it and, by implication, that individual’s response to it.”<sup>3</sup> Seeing only part of the whole picture will often lead someone to form an incomplete idea of what is actually being seen. In other words, the way a person sees a problem often defines the problem. It follows that how you define a problem in turn influences choices about how much time, money, effort, and talent you are willing to invest toward the problem.

The elephant analogy holds true for how we view the world and the international security environment. Often, only looking at part of the problem, or approaching a problem from only a regional perspective, may blind us to the whole picture of how the problem exists in a global environment. The world is a complex adaptive system in which a very large set of variables interact. “With that in mind, the U.S. must shift from a regional to a global view of the international security environment to better understand and respond to its challenges.”<sup>4</sup> It is clear that trends in the international security environment are tending towards threats that do not respect traditional boundaries.<sup>5</sup> A global perspective is now necessary to ensure the nation’s defense. To enable the GWOT we must have a global perspective, and the best way to achieve that perspective is through ISR operations that are planned and executed as a campaign.

Persistent and pervasive ISR operations will be needed to enable short, focused military or law enforcement action. A greater reliance on these types of ISR operations will place even greater demands on already over-tasked low density/high demand (LDHD) ISR assets such as UAVs, theater and national airborne collection platforms like the EP-3 and Rivet Joint, space based imagery systems, and human agents.

This growing reliance on persistent ISR across a global target set will undoubtedly continue to motivate the search for new concepts and technologies that increase and better enable ISR efforts and capabilities. “This can and should include redoubled emphasis on high-resolution, persistent ISR technologies, such as the Predator and Global Hawk unmanned air vehicles”<sup>6</sup> as well as an expanded Human Intelligence capability. More importantly, though, it again signals a need for ISR operations to be planned and executed as a campaign.

### **Who Should Plan the Campaign and Why?**

#### ***New Relationships in the New Environment***

“Today’s functional combatant commands are relatively recent creations that began with the establishment of US Space Command (USSPACECOM) in 1985. In the 15 years that followed, successive administrations established US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), STRATCOM, and US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The rise of these functional commands highlights the reality that some military missions or responsibilities can be better fulfilled by carving out functions from regional commands’ responsibilities than by having the functions dispersed among the varied and widely dispersed regional commands.”<sup>7</sup>

It is clear that almost from the very beginning functions or missions that crossed regional boundaries required a focused commander of their own to manage the activity. It is also clear that today’s threat environment has increased the chances that problems will cross regional boundaries. “Obviously, terrorist networks today have a global presence, with members and cells around the world, and the U.S. can no longer adequately counter terrorism by relying exclusively on regional strategies. A global, vice regional, approach to the problem is the answer.”<sup>8</sup> The newly transformed STRATCOM appears to be the best answer for addressing just this sort of global problem. In recognition of this, it has been assigned some missions that have been unassigned previously and some that overlap the



responsibilities of regional combatant commands. STRATCOM's focus has been considerably broadened. It has global responsibilities and it must have a global perspective.<sup>9</sup>

Although STRATCOM's missions have grown, the missions of regional combatant commands remain unchanged. They are still expected to provide "essential regional expertise; they represent an enduring basis for U.S. presence around the globe; they are the keys to successful theater-security cooperation with allies and friends; and they form the basis for pursuing multinational interoperability and military coalitions. In both peace and war, regional combatant commands give direction to, and exert C2 over, U.S. military activities around the world."<sup>10</sup>

The challenge, then, is to balance what the regional commander does and must do with whatever construct is used to address global problems. "Whether combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities are divided along functional lines and addressed on a global basis or whether they continue to be addressed along regional lines, seams, or discontinuities where one command's responsibilities end and another's begin, usually are created."<sup>11</sup> These seams cannot be avoided unless a single organization is placed in charge of everything, everywhere, all the time. Since the seams cannot always be avoided, they often become the vulnerabilities that are exploited. Although great thought was given to the placement of the seams, it is becoming ever clearer that no matter how carefully the seams are placed they often become the scenes of crisis. The seams are perfect places for adversaries to confound and confuse U.S. efforts and interests.

It follows that missions that cross all of the regional boundaries require a global approach in addressing them. Although we cannot put someone in charge of *everything*, everywhere, all the time we can, in a sense, put someone in charge of *something*, everywhere,

all the time. The classic example of one such mission is computer-network defense.

“Electrons do not respect geographic boundaries, and requiring each of our geographic commands to plan independently for protecting computer networks would create unacceptable seams. Thus, the lead for computer-network defense was assigned to USSPACECOM in 1999. This assignment of a global mission to a commander with a global perspective was a precursor of the new missions assigned to STRATCOM.”<sup>12</sup>

Like computer-network defense, there are several other areas that can be best addressed globally vice regionally. These inherently global mission areas “include (1) integration of missile defense across AORs; (2) certain elements of IO; (3) space operations; (4) global strike operations; (5) *intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities* and (6) counterterrorism.”<sup>13</sup>

The new nature of the threat facing America demands that the U.S. develop new global capabilities. Depending on the mission, we may see regional combatant commands as either supported or supporting commanders. One aspect that will be prevalent will be the need for a global perspective in planning and execution of global operations. And since many of these global operations cross regional boundaries it is fair to assume that regional combatant commands will more often than not find themselves in a supporting role. “In the future, we are much more likely to see regional commands supporting the new STRATCOM... This change in roles will require our regional combatant commands to develop a deeper appreciation for the global perspective of America’s security needs.”<sup>14</sup>

To enable global operations, the U.S. “will need global ISR activities for gathering indications and warning data and for otherwise enabling global strike, space operations, certain elements of IO, and integrated missile defense. Moreover, global C2 capabilities and

the knowledge to enable and integrate regional operations with global operations, as well as integrating regional operations in one AOR with those of another is necessary.”<sup>15</sup> Global ISR needs to be much more than ISR conducted across several regions with the collected information combined and analyzed in some attempt at divining the big picture.

“Knitting together various regionally focused ISR activities is unlikely to yield a coherent global perspective. Simply put, we cannot obtain a relevant global perspective without ISR activities that, to some degree, are globally coordinated and directed- a function [currently] performed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The new factor is that, given the LDHD nature of many of our ISR resources, regional combatant commands are more likely than before to be required to conduct ISR activities in support of global operations tasked to USSOCOM or STRATCOM.”<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, the Unified Command Plan 02, Change 2, assigns STRATCOM the responsibility for "planning, integrating and coordinating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) in support of strategic and global operations, as directed." In addition to developing these ISR campaign plans, it further assigns responsibility for "tasking and coordinating C<sup>4</sup>ISR capabilities in support of strategic force employment, to include global strike, missile defense and the associated planning."<sup>17</sup> It is for all of these aforementioned reasons that STRATCOM must develop and implement a global ISR campaign similar in nature and scope to other combatant commander's campaign plans.

## **Campaign Definitions**

### ***Definition and Purpose of Campaigns***

According to joint doctrine, a campaign plan is “a plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space.”<sup>18</sup> In short, a campaign is the tool that integrates, sequences, and synchronizes operations together at the operational level of war to achieve some objective. It accomplishes this by translating broad strategic guidance into operational direction for

subordinates. Campaign planning itself is a continuing, deliberate planning process in which the campaign planners must focus attention not only on actions in the current operation, but also on the next operation. The plan should continually develop and be revised as the situation changes and new opportunities present themselves. Campaign plans synchronize operations in a very unique way by: establishing command relationships among subordinate commands; describing the concept of operations; assigning tasks and objectives; and task-organizing assigned forces.

Campaign plans support strategic planning, and functional commanders approach such planning differently than regional commanders. “Combatant commanders with functional responsibilities, i.e. STRATCOM, USSOCOM, and USTRANSCOM and their component commanders may conduct planning. They view their planning problem as unconstrained by geography...planning for possible sequential or concurrent execution of more than one operation [that] outweighs the regional perspective.”<sup>19</sup> Campaign planning is the means for a commander to integrate various operations and thus give purpose and a common objective to each operation.

Joint doctrine also makes it clear that campaign planning is not just a tool for fighting a war. “Campaign planning is an effective methodology for situations other than war. [Commanders] may develop campaign plans for peacetime, conflict, or war. While intended primarily to guide the use of military power, campaign plans must integrate all instruments of national power...to attain national strategic objectives.”<sup>20</sup> The asymmetric advantage the U.S. possesses in its intelligence collection and processing capabilities is one such instrument of national power.

Finally, because each campaign is unique there can be no single checklist to develop an operational concept. “However, at a minimum, the concept should address the method of defeating the opponent, application of forces and capabilities, sequencing, synchronization and integration of forces and capabilities and operational functions.”<sup>21</sup>

### ***Not Just Another Operational Function***

“Successful employment of...forces across the operational continuum requires the existence, and an effective organization, of functions.”<sup>22</sup> These so-called operational functions traditionally include command and control (C2), intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, logistics, and protection. These operational functions are used by an operational commander in planning and execution of campaigns in addition to the sequencing and synchronization of joint forces.

Some might argue that there can be no such thing as an ISR campaign because ISR is a subset of operational intelligence, which itself is simply an operational function. This, however, is not the case because an ISR campaign will not just perform the function associated with operational intelligence (i.e. supporting planning, preparation, and execution of major operations or campaigns) but instead will actually use forces and operational functions to achieve a strategic ISR-related objective. An operational commander will plan and execute an ISR campaign by sequencing and synchronizing ISR assets and operations. The operational functions enumerated above will be used to support the ISR operations that, when linked together in time and space, result in an ISR campaign. For example, operational intelligence will be required to provide guidance and background for when and where the ISR operations will take place. It will also provide feedback as to the effects of the ISR operations. The operational function of C2 will be employed by the commander as he

sequences and synchronizes the activity of all necessary ISR elements in the campaign. The right C2 should also provide the necessary unity of effort and command for success as well as spelling out the responsibilities of each discrete command echelon in the campaign. An ISR campaign dependent on LDHD assets will obviously rely heavily on operational logistics to ensure that the right forces, materiel, and support are in the right places at the right time. Although the list could continue for how each operational function will be used to support the ISR campaign, the aforementioned ones should be enough for illustrative purposes. It should now be clear that an ISR campaign will be more than just the operational function of intelligence.

### **Why ISR Campaign Planning Will be Different**

#### ***ISR Campaign Defined***

A global ISR campaign will therefore be a campaign in the truest sense of the word. The term campaign is often misapplied to what are essentially discrete major operations. This error is most often the result of a semantic misunderstanding by those who are describing the action. For example, many military commanders described previous major military actions like Operation Desert Storm, Operation Noble Anvil, and Operation Iraqi Freedom as campaigns when in fact it can be convincingly argued that these were major operations. They do not fit the traditional definition of a campaign but rather were a series of battles and engagements that in total formed an operation. Thus, a global ISR campaign, to qualify as a campaign and to reap the benefits of campaign planning, must be more than a series of unconnected collection activities aimed only at answering stated intelligence requirements.

There are many benefits to be reaped from an ISR campaign. The first is sequenced and synchronized ISR operations. ISR operations conceived, planned and executed from cradle to grave as a specific campaign rather than concocted as an afterthought in support of another operation could produce superior results. A campaign would provide broad concepts of operations in support of objectives, order expected decisions to be made into schedules for decision makers, aid in achieving unity of effort, organize subordinate forces, establish command relationships, serve as a basis for other plans, and define success.<sup>23</sup> It could produce actionable intelligence in which ISR operations are part of a coordinated plan vice individual tactical actions that are discrete and unconnected to a broader objective or that are conducted in support of other operations and only fulfilling the function of operational intelligence. ISR operations will be treated as major operations themselves and not simply be thought of as part of an operational function supporting a larger theater security cooperation plan or war-fighting effort. Campaign planning will help assure ISR assets are channeled against enemy vulnerabilities at the time and place of our choosing, vice in response to a crisis or simply because there are no other competing requirements at that time. An ISR campaign will be proactive vice reactive and help retain friendly freedom of action in scheduling the deployment and employment of LDHD ISR assets.

Campaign plans involve sequencing and synchronizing multiple operations across greater time and space domains, which means that such plans look well into the future. This in turn should allow greater fidelity and granularity in the scheduling of LDHD ISR assets and the associated training and maintenance that goes with them as well as acting as a guide for future procurement efforts. This will help ease OPTEMPO and prevent early fatigue of scarce resources. “The anticipated demand for future resources” detailed in a campaign plan

“serves to alert higher authorities, i.e. the national leadership or the combined and joint staffs, of the current and future national preparations that will be necessary.”<sup>24</sup>

In the absence of combat operations and execution of regional commander’s Operation Plans (OPLANS), the global ISR campaign will fill a critical role. STRATCOM, acting as a supported commander and using operational artistry, will develop and execute a global campaign plan that integrates, synchronizes, and sequences ISR operations to optimize the desired effect and achieve strategic objectives. The assignment of a supported commander role to STRATCOM and the debate such a role will engender deserves to be addressed here.

Inevitably, someone will make the claim that functional combatant commands should always support regional combatant commands. Implied, if not stated, is the belief that conducting operations or executing missions is the sole purview of regional combatant commands and that no functional combatant command should conduct operations in a regional combatant commander’s AOR. Such hard-and-fast rules have never existed, and supported-supporting relationships continue to depend on the situation and mission objectives. That is why supported-supporting relationships are spelled out in planning orders, deployment orders, execution orders, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, OPLANS, and concept plans.<sup>25</sup>

Spelling out STRATCOM’s lead in the supported role for the development and execution of a global ISR campaign makes the most sense. If the top decision makers in Washington maintain a global perspective then so must those who support them.

STRATCOM will plan and conduct the global ISR campaign to help all the combatant commanders gain and maintain a global perspective. “If we attempt to do otherwise, we will surely end up like the six blind men in their first encounter with an elephant, endlessly disputing the nature of something we fail to perceive fully. By shifting our view from a regional to a global perspective, we will better comprehend and respond to America’s security needs in the twenty-first century”.<sup>26</sup>



A global ISR campaign and its associated operations will be planned and executed for a global theater. Regional commanders will support the operations as defined in the campaign plan and sometimes will be supported by the campaign. These functional commands will be able to execute their assigned tasks within the AORs of regional commanders, who may be required to support the functional commanders' requirements in an almost total role reversal of conventionally thought of roles of support. The regional command's support to the functional commander conducting a global mission could include personnel, logistics and intra-theater transportation.

In executing the operations of the campaign, ISR assets could remain under the operational control (OPCON) of regional commanders or control could be retained by STRATCOM. In the case where OPCON rests with the regional commander, liaison by STRATCOM planners in the campaign development phase should ensure that ISR activity will continue to fulfill both regional and global requirements. As an example, one aspect of the global ISR campaign may be to gather general military intelligence and provide Indications and Warning on a specific targeted organization. Operations fulfilling this requirement could also fulfill standing intelligence requirements of a regional commander and in the case of transnational problems may satisfy even more than one regional commander.

Finally, STRATCOM must ensure that an appropriate C2 organization is created to match the regional commander's requirements within the bigger picture of the global ISR campaign. The supporting commanders must synchronize their own ISR plans and operations with the global ISR campaign. STRATCOM then will provide the necessary

centralized direction while in some cases allowing the regional commanders to conduct decentralized execution.

## **Operationalizing the Strategy**

### ***New Operating Patterns and Concepts***

New plans and new capabilities demand new operating patterns and concepts for execution and employment. In the simplest terms, an ISR campaign will consist of STRATCOM acting as the supported commander to do the following: Synchronize ISR operations in time and space with regard to the ISR forces available. STRATCOM will do this without regard to regional combatant commander geographic boundaries. This will ensure continuity on target whenever and wherever it crosses seams. It also eliminates the “rob Peter to pay Paul” scenario often endemic to operations requiring LDHD assets. In essence, a global ISR campaign will ensure that competition for resources is managed so no one commander can “steal” or monopolize a needed platform or capability. This overarching management will be possible since an ISR campaign will project and plan for future operations even as current operations are executed. Appendix A offers one suggested example of how an ISR campaign plan could be structured.

Under the current system the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) acts as the central clearing house to deconflict and schedule assets to fill collection requirements. DIA’s Defense Collection Group “levies intelligence requirements on collection agencies and resources, monitors, collection responses, and evaluates collections efforts in terms of reliability, efficiency, and cost.”<sup>27</sup> What DIA does not do, though, is provide any type of objective-oriented direction to the collection effort. It simply evaluates and weighs requests for collections and assigns assets to fulfill the requirements. It does this without regard to

how the intelligence information derived from separate requirements may be related.

Without a central, coordinated campaign that synchronizes all of this, we will continue to have combatant commands competing for scarce ISR resources and replicating ISR functions. Currently, the system provides a regionally focused perspective through disjointed, discrete ISR operations instead of getting the synergistic effect desired and achievable with a global ISR campaign.

By placing liaison officers at other combatant commands, STRATCOM will drive ISR discipline and preparation by integrating core ISR capabilities into each of the other commander's deliberate and crisis planning early in the process. These liaison officers will have visibility into the global ISR campaign and will understand how the other OPLANS will be affected if executed. It will help avoid the crisis reaction of over allocating scarce ISR assets to a theater without a well thought out employment plan or understanding of how other aspects of the ISR campaign will be affected.

Additionally, STRATCOM can develop standing ISR packages tailored to specific OPLANS so that when executed the OPLANS will have minimal impact on the rest of the world and the global ISR campaign can continue to be executed.

## **Conclusion**

So what is the purpose and real value-added of a global ISR campaign? The answer is the campaign will provide a holistic view of the world that is essential to dealing with transnational threats. The holistic view will overcome the seams and broken coverage that occurs between regional commands. It will help reduce complexity by providing unity of effort through centralized direction and decentralized execution while growing and retaining common doctrine and corporate knowledge for ISR operations.

The development of an ISR campaign and the assignment of STRATCOM as the lead, supported commander in planning and executing the campaign will alleviate the regional perspective and seam problems currently plaguing U.S. security efforts.

Assigning this role to STRATCOM makes sense. Although the growing necessity for functional commands to exercise the role of supported commander is sure to have major implications on strategy and operational considerations, it is clear that the functional commands' authority to draw on the resources of regional commands in executing specific, global operations surely will continue. In this capacity, STRATCOM is imbued with missions that are global in nature. Assigning the functional commands the role of a supported commander makes sense in other ways. From one perspective, assigning functional commanders supported-command authority sustains the maximum force/minimum footprint principle and eliminates redundancy. Current concepts "discourage traditional deployment scenarios involving large numbers of ground troops, armor packages and artillery assets—including their vast logistical tails. By drawing on the resources of geographic commands, the functional commands are not relegated to a subordinate segment of the operation but rather may take the lead. A significant portion of the conventional force may be included only as a secondary consideration—provided it sees action at all."<sup>28</sup>

A continuous, global, joint ISR campaign that is executed by STRATCOM, acting as a supported commander by defining the objective of an ISR campaign and then planning and conducting that campaign is one possible solution to our problems. This paper provided the background and argument for a change in ISR planning and suggested one method on how it should be done. It remains clear that to meet 21<sup>st</sup> Century security challenges, DOD must transform how ISR operations are planned, managed, and executed.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Edward R. Harshberger, "Global Implications for the U.S. Air Force," RAND Review, Summer 2002, <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.08.02/global.html>> [08 January 2004], 1.

<sup>2</sup> Harshberger lists countries like Algeria, Bosnia, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen as possible candidates. Harshberger, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Myers recounts the following "ancient Oriental story. In ancient India, six blind men encountered an elephant for the first time and quickly began to squabble about the nature of elephants. The first blind man bumped into the elephant's side and declared that the beast was like a wall. The second, discovering the ear, concluded it was like a fan. The third blind man came across the tail and thought the elephant to be very much like a rope. The fourth, encountering the elephant's leg, was sure the animal resembled a tree. Finding the tusk, the fifth blind man proclaimed the elephant to be like a spear. And the sixth, grasping the elephants' trunk, concluded the giant pachyderm most resembled a snake." General Richard B. Myers, "A Word from the Chairman-Shift to a Global Perspective," Air and Space Power Journal, (Fall 2003), 5.

<sup>4</sup> Myers, 5.

<sup>5</sup> Myers, 8.

<sup>6</sup> Harshberger, 2.

<sup>7</sup> Myers, 7.

<sup>8</sup> Myers, 8.

<sup>9</sup> Myers, 7-8.

<sup>10</sup> Myers, 8.

<sup>11</sup> Myers, 8.

<sup>12</sup> Myers, 8.

<sup>13</sup> Myers also states that "Missile defense is a responsibility of all of our regional combatant commands. However, no such command, including the newly established USNORTHCOM, is more suited than any other to integrate missile defense operations across AORs in support of the president's stated goal of providing protection for deployed US forces, allies, and friends. When missiles in a distant theater can be used against targets anywhere on the globe, the United States needs global ISR and global C2

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to integrate its missile defense capabilities, which, by the way, include offensive capabilities to preempt or prevent missile attacks. We cannot afford to think of missile defense merely in terms of actively intercepting missiles after launch.

Similarly, certain elements of IO require a global perspective and better integration of our nation's capabilities. Although IO should become a core war-fighting capability of all our combatant commands, certain IO activities could create effects of such magnitude that focusing on regional consequences would become unnecessarily restrictive and ultimately unhelpful. Even when the effects of IO are limited to a single AOR, we will need a global perspective to ensure that theater IO is compatible with IO in other AORs. A global perspective will often provide the essential starting point for success, whether we are attempting to get a message across to an audience that spans more than one theater, conducting electronic warfare (EW) activities to inhibit long-distance communications, performing computer-network operations, or carrying out military-deception programs. Even within a single theater, STRATCOM will add value to the regional combatant commands by integrating efforts previously stovepiped in different organizations (e.g., C2 warfare, psychological operations [PSYOP], EW, and computer network attack [CNA]).

Space operations present another military-mission area requiring a global perspective rather than a regional focus. Given the vital role space operations play in global communications, one cannot always determine precisely where space operations end and IO begins. In the past, the supported-supporting relationships between regional combatant commands and USSPACECOM were predominantly one way, with the latter supporting the regional commands." Myers, 8-9.

<sup>14</sup> Myers, 9.

<sup>15</sup> Myers, 9.

<sup>16</sup> Myers, 9.

<sup>17</sup> Brig. Gen. Robert P. Lennox and Lt. Col. Eric Henderson, "The Right Answers to the Warfighter's Questions," Army Magazine, December 2003, <<http://www.ausa.org/www/armymag.nsf/0/6F67D5A86C91B74A85256DE3005E410A?OpenDocument>> [08 January 2004].

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, Washington, DC.

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, Joint Pub 5-00.1, Washington, DC: 25 January 2002, I-5.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, I-6 through I-7.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, II-12.

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<sup>22</sup> Milan Vego, Operational Warfare. 2000, NWC 1004, 185.

<sup>23</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, Joint Pub 5-00.1, Washington, DC: 25 January 2002, I-3.

<sup>24</sup> Ronald M. D'Amura, "Campaigns: The Essence of Operational Warfare," Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Vol. XVII, no.2, (Summer 1987): 42-51.

<sup>25</sup> Myers continues that "Moreover, the term supported does not imply sole responsibility for execution. A supporting combatant commander can execute or conduct operations in support of the supported commander- something USTRANSCOM does every day. Ultimately, combatant commanders support the president and secretary of defense in the pursuit of American security, and the array of possible command relations between combatant commanders should not be constrained unnecessarily. To the extent we can harness the ability to observe and operate globally, without self-imposed artificial limitations, we will generate new military capabilities to add to the ones we have today, thereby yielding a greater number of military options from which the president can choose. Myers, 10.

<sup>26</sup> Myers, 10.

<sup>27</sup> William B. Huntington, "DIA's Collection Group," Communique, November/December 1996, 18.

<sup>28</sup> Peter Gillete, "The 2002 Unified Command Plan: Changes and Implications," National Security Watch, (21 February 2003), 7.

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APPENDIX A

ISR CAMPAIGN CONSTRUCT

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## Campaign Construct

The following template is offered as one method for organizing and planning an ISR campaign. This construct is based on the Naval War College Global War Game reference book for campaign planning. A template such as this can be used by planners as a starting point to help ensure they think about and address critical pieces in campaign development. After each heading (where appropriate) a short explanatory note is included to describe the type of information that should be included in that section. Campaign planners should remember to attempt to include in the plan only those issues which are critical to the stated objective. Although no single checklist can be developed to cover all aspects of campaign planning it will be beneficial to keep some of these issues in mind.

**1. Command and Control Relationships:** Define clear relationships for the organizational structure for the plan. State the relationships as simply as possible.

Organizational relationships.

Supporting/supported relationships.

**2. Situation/Regional Environment:** Summarize the most important background information. This section will be used by other (subordinate) planners as they complete the process.

a. Description

b. Theater/Regional Strategy

c. Strategic Guidance

(1) Strategic Objective

(2) Strategic Constraints

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(3) Other tasks

d. Enemy/Threat

(1) Threat centers of gravity

(2) Threat desired end state and objectives

(3) Threat strategy/trends

(4) Threat strategic strengths/weaknesses

(5) Threat operational strengths/weaknesses

e. Friendly forces/organizations

(1) Intent

(2) Politics

(3) Public opinion

**3. Unified Operations/Action Plan:** Provide the necessary vision statement to allow others to understand the general direction and objectives of the campaign. Explain what is to be done, how it will be done, who will do it, and when it will be done.

a. Campaign Vision

b. Campaign Strategy

c. Area of Operations

d. Tasks and Assistance

e. Coordinating Instructions

f. Detailed Campaign Phases (For each Phase)

(1) Forces/agency personnel required

(2) Phase operational concept

(a) Leader's intent/operational objective for the phase

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(b) Scheme of maneuver/operations

- (3) Timing
- (4) Support required from other agencies during the phase
- (5) Fires
- (6) Information
- (7) Reserve
- (8) Contingencies during the phase
- (9) Phase tasks
- (10) Phase coordinating instructions

**4. Logistics/Resourcing:** Provide the necessary guidance to allow subordinates to develop detailed concepts and plans to support the campaign.

- a. Logistics/resource assessment
- b. Logistics/resource control
- c. Logistics Strategy

- (1) Intent and priority
- (2) Organization
- (3) Concept

d. Transportation Strategy

- (1) Control
- (2) Organization
- (3) Phases
- (4) Lines of communication
- (5) Security

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e. Budget

f. Personnel

**5. Command and Control:** This final section should be used to provide details on how the campaign will be controlled during execution. It must spell out the process of how the flow of orders will happen, what can be delegated, what decisions must be made, and command philosophy.

a. C2

(1) Flow of orders

(2) Delegation of Authority

(3) Leader Decisions

(4) International Relationships, Intelligence Sharing and Exchange

b. Communications

c. Intelligence/feedback

d. Plans and orders

e. Information